We investigate a dynamic oligopoly game with price adjustments. We show that the subgame perfect equilibria are characterised by larger output and lower price levels then the open-loop solution. The individual (and industry) output at the closed-loop equilibrium is larger than its counterpart at the feedback equilibrium. Therefore, …rms prefer the open-loop equilibrium to the feedback equilibrium, and the latter to the closed-loop equilibrium. The opposite applies to consumers.
Introduction
The aim of this note consists in assessing comparatively the properties of open-loop, feedback and closed-loop memoryless equilibria in a dynamic oligopoly model with price dynamics …rst introduced by Simaan and Takayama (1978) and then extended by Fershtman and Kamien (1987) .
Broadly speaking, the main di¤erence between the open-loop equilibrium on one side and the feedback and closed-loop equilibria on the other, is that the former does not take into account strategic interaction between players through the evolution of state variables over time and the associated adjustment in controls. Under the open-loop rule, players choose their respective plans at the initial date and commit to them forever. Therefore, in general, open-loop equilibria are not subgame perfect, in that they are only weakly time consistent because players make their action 'by the clock' only. 1 A further distinction can be made between the closed-loop equilibrium and the feedback equilibrium, which are both strongly time consistent and therefore subgame perfect because, at any date ¿ , players decide 'by the stock' of all state variables. However, while the closed-loop memoryless equilibrium takes into account the initial and current levels of all state variables, The information set associated with the closed-loop decision rule can take several forms. One consists in the level of the state variable(s) at the intial and current dates. This is usually de…ned as the closed-loop memoryless decision rule. Another consists in the whole path of state variable(s) from the initial date to the present time. This is de…ned as closed-loop perfect state information rule. the feedback equilibrium accounts for the accumulated stock of each state variable at the current date. If one player decide according to the feedback rule, then it is optimal for the others to do so as well. Hence, the feedback equilibrium is a closed-loop equilibrium, while the opposite is not true in general. 3 We extend the analysis of Fershtman and Kamien (1987) to investigate the open-loop, closed-loop memoryless and feedback equilibria of an industry with more than two players. Then, we characterise the closed-loop equilibrium for this market, to show the following results: (i) both subgame perfect equilibria involve a larger production and a lower price as compared to the open-loop solution; (ii) the steady state price and output levels are, respectively, higher and lower in the closed-loop equilibrium than in the feedback equilibrium. Property (i) can be reformulated by saying that, if …rms are unable to initially commit to a given output plan for the whole time horizon, then subgame perfection entails overproduction (for analogous results see Spence, 1979; and Reynolds, 1987) . Property (ii) suggests that the feedback rule allows …rms to reduce overproduction as compared to the closed-loop rule, precisely because according to the feedback rule they look exclusively at the current level of the state variable. Probably the simplest way to think about the dynamics of market interaction consists in assuming that prices evolve over time according to some acceptable rules. That is, it consists in taking price as the state variable. This is the problem analysed in Simaan and Takayama (1978) and Fershtman and Kamien (1987). 4 Here, we present a generalisation of Fershtman and Kamien's setup to the case of N …rms. 5 Consider an oligopoly where, at any t 2 [0; 1); N …rms produce quantities q i (t); i 2 f1; 2; :::N g; of the same homogeneous good at a total cost
In each period, market demand determines the price level b
In general, however, b p(t); will di¤er from the current price level p(t); since there is price stickness, and price moves according to the following equation: dp(t) dt´:
Notice that the dynamics described by (1) establishes that price adjusts proportionately to the di¤erence between the price level given by the inverse demand function and the current price level, the speed of adjustment being determined by the constant s;with 0 < s < 1.This amounts to saying tha the price mechanism is sticky, that is, …rms face menu costs in adjusting 4 See also Mehlmann (1988, ch. 5) for an exhaustive exposition of both contributions, and Fershtman and Kamien (1990), and Tsutsui and Mino (1990) for further results on the same model, in the case of a …nite horizon. 5 An interesting application of this model to the analysis of adverting strategies is in Piga (2000) . Trade policy issues are investigated by Haugh (1990, 1991) .
their price to the demand conditions deriving from consumers' preferences:
they may not (and, in general, the will not) choose outputs so that the price
The instantaneous pro…t function of …rm i is:
Hence, the problem of …rm i is:
subject to (1) 
The open-loop solution
Here we look for the open-loop Nash equilibrium, i.e., we examine a situation where …rms commit to a production plan at t = 0 and stick to that plan forever.
The Hamiltonian function is:
where¸i(t) = ¹ i (t)e ½t ; and ¹ i (t) is the co-state variable associated to p(t):
The supplementary variable¸i(t) is introduced to ease calculations as well as the remainder of the exposition. In the remainder of the paper, superscript 
The pair
is a saddle point.
Proof. Consider the …rst order condition (FOC) w.r.t. q i (t); calculated using (4):
This yields the optimal open-loop output for …rm i; as follows:
The remaining conditions for optimum are:
Di¤erentiating (6) and using (7), we obtain:
Now, substitute into (9) (i) dp=dt = s fb p(t) ¡ p(t)g ;
where a symmetry assumption is introduced for individual …rm's output; and
(ii) s¸(t) = p(t) ¡ c ¡ q(t) from (6). This yields:
6
In the remainder, we consider the positive solution. Obviously, the derivation of the steady state entails non-negativity constraints on price and quantity, that we assume to be satis…ed.
Note that dq(t)=dt = 0 is a linear relationship between p(t) and q(t): This, together with dp(t)=dt = 0; also a linear function, fully characterise the steady state of the system. The dynamic system can be immediately rewritten in matrix form as follows: 
As the determinant of the above 2 £ 2 matrix is negative, the equilibrium point is a saddle, with
This concludes the proof.
As in the duopoly case described by Fershtman and Kamien (1987 pp.
1159-61), also here the static Cournot-Nash equilibrium price and output 
The feedback solution
In this section, we extend the analysis of the feedback solution investigated by Fershtman and Kamien (1987) to the case of N …rms. Using Bellman's value function approach, the feedback solution must satisfy the following set of Hamilton-Bellman-Jacobi equations (see Starr and Ho, 1989) :
where V i (p (t)) is the value function for …rm i: Hereinafter, the indication of time will be dropped to ease the exposition. Given the linear-quadratic form of the maximand, we follow Fershtman and Kamien (1987) , and propose the quadratic value function:
so that
Henceforth, the superscript F stands for feedback. The outcome of the game is summarised by:
Proposition 2 At the feedback Nash equilibrium, the steady state levels of the price and the individual output are:
Proof. Taking the FOC w.r.t.q i ; we obtain:
where we invoke the symmetry conditions g i = g; k i = k and h i = h; so that q i = q for all i: On the basis of (16) and (1), we …nd:
where h and k can be calculated by the following procedure. We can rewrite (13) as:
that is:¯1
Expression (19) is satis…ed if expressions (20), (21) and (22), i.e., coe¢cients 1 ;¯2 and¯3 are simultaneously zero. This makes up a system of three equations in three unknowns, fg ; h ; kg ; with the following solutions:
We choose the smaller solution for k in (25), which yields -when N = 2 -the same expression as in Fershtman and Kamien (1987, Theorem 2, p. 1157).
This establishes that
The closed-loop solution
The closed-loop memoryless solution remains to investigate. We use superscript CL to denote the closed-loop equilibrium levels of the relevant variables. The Hamiltonian of …rm i is given by (4) , and the outcome is summarised by the following:
Proposition 3 At the closed-loop Nash equilibrium, the steady state levels of the price and the individual output are:
Proof. The …rst order condition w.r.t. q i ; calculated using (4), obviously coincide with condition (5) calculated in the open-loop case:
This yields the closed-loop output for …rm i; as follows (again, in the remainder we shall consider only the positive solution):
Now consider that
Therefore:
is the additional term in the co-state equation, characterising the strategic interaction among …rms, which is not considered by de…nition in the openloop solution (see, e.g., Driskill and McCa¤erty, 1989) . Equation (29) 
Then we have the transversality condition:
Di¤erentiating (28) w.r.t. time and using (32), we obtain:
Now, substitute into (34) the expressions (i) dp=dt = s fb p ¡ pg ; with b p(t) = A ¡ N q; where a symmetry assumption is introduced for individual …rm's output; and (ii) s¸= p ¡ c ¡ q which obtains from (27). This yields:
As in the open-loop case, dq=dt = 0 is a linear relationship between p and q:
This, together with dp=dt = 0; which is also a linear function, yields
as the unique steady state of the system. 7 The dynamic system can be immediately rewritten in matrix form to verify that the pair 
The proof is straightforward. In words, con…ning our attention to the equilibria of the dynamic setting, all subgame perfect equilibria entails a 
Concluding remarks
We have investigated the properties of a dynamic oligopoly game with sticky prices. The foregoing analysis shows that subgame perfection always entails larger output and lower price levels in steady state, as compared to the weakly time consistent open-loop solution. In particular, the individual and industry output associated to the closed-loop equilibrium is larger than its counterpart at the feedback equilibrium. Two further (and related) remarks are in order. First, the foregoing analysis highlights that the larger the relevant information set, the larger the overproduction compared to the (commitment) open-loop equilibrium. The second is that among the subgame perfect solution concepts, the feedback rule appears to be able to minimise overproduction. Accordingly, while …rms would prefer the open-loop equilibrium to the feedback equilibrium, and the latter to the closed-loop equilibrium, the opposite holds from the social standpoint.
